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examined. The extant studies either focus on aggregate outcome of decentralization at country level or concern the influence of decentralization within individual countries. To fill the gap, we intend to offer a comparative investigation of the effect of decentralization on how ordinary people perceive government, that is, citizens' trust in political institutions. Rather than simply testing its direct effect, we also explore the indirect effect of decentralization by examining its influence on the relationship between democratic orientation and political trust. As revealed in earlier studies, political trust links contextual attributes of a political system with orientations of individuals (Weatherford 1992; Norris 1999; Dalton and Anderson 2011) . Both micro mechanisms like individuals' democratic orientation and such macro context as decentralization in which these micro mechanisms take place are involved in trust formation. Moving from this assumption, we hypothesize that the effect of decentralization on political trust does not only manifest directly in individuals' attitudes, but also through contextualizing and thus moderating the relationship political trust and its various correlates, in particular, democratic values. People holding greater democratic values tend to trust government institutions less, but this negative association is weaker in a more decentralized system. Employing a multi-level analysis of the World Value Survey data (WVS 2005 (WVS -2006 , we found that the effect of decentralization is neither direct nor universal as commonly assumed.
First, while at the country level various measures of decentralization are significantly associated with country-averaged institutional trust in different directions, we find that this relationship does not hold at the individual level. This not only indicates ecological fallacy of inference from country-level association, but also suggests that we cannot assume a simple direct effect of 4 decentralization on political trust. Second, when examining political trust at individual level, we find that there are significant interaction effects between decentralization and democratic attitude.
This implies that the actual influences of decentralization on political trust work through moderating the relationship between political trust and democratic values.
Moreover, at both aggregate and individual level, we find that different forms of decentralization have variant impacts on political trust. In aggregate analyses, both fiscal and administrative decentralization are positively associated with trust; but political dimension of decentralization is negatively associated with trust. Similarly, at the individual level, both fiscal and administrative decentralization attenuates the negative effect of democratic value on political trust; but political decentralization aggravates the negative effect of democratic value. Finally, the effect of decentralization is more evident in democratic countries than in authoritarian countries. Before presenting our analyses and results, we first turn to the related literature to ground our expectations regarding the effect of decentralization on political trust.
Decentralization and its political consequences
Although theories that directly link decentralization and political trust are sparse, a review of the literature suggests that decentralization is widely perceived to be able to promote political trust (Diamond, 1999; Vetter 2002; Bovaird and Loeffler 2005) . Decentralization helps promote political trust in ways: first, it improves the relationship between government and its citizenry, and, second, it enhances government performance and output.
Through two mechanisms, decentralization is expected to improve the relationship between Provided with considerable power devolution, local government and politicians become more visible, which increases citizens' perceptions of the access to policy makers and institutions (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Frandsen, 2002) . This increased proximity helps people develop an articulate understanding of government agencies, making them more confident of the incentives of the government agencies. Compared to their counterparts in a decentralized system, citizens in a decentralized system are more likely believe that the misbehaviors of officials will be relatively easily caught under their watch.
Second, decentralization helps increase citizens' trust in political institutions by fostering political participation (Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2013; Smith 2009; Campbell 2003; Oats 1999; De Mello 2004) .When decision-making authority is devolved to lower levels of government, citizens are provided with more opportunities to be engaged in policy making process.
Particularly, local constituents who are marginalized at the national level are more motivated to participate in decision making because they are better informed about the local affairs and more knowledgeable about local officials (Shah 1998), and local affairs are more related to their interest. The increased political and civic engagement in political process increases citizens' political efficacy, which in turn help boost trust in political institutions.
In addition to improvement of the relationship between the citizens and the government, decentralization is expected to deliver better government performance which also in turn helps cultivate political trust (Brennanand Buchanan, 1980; Montinola et al., 1995) . First, 6 decentralization, as Tiebout (1956) argues, shortens the "informational distance" between the providers and recipients of public goods and services, and thus enhances government provision of those goods and services (De Mello, Luiz R. 2004) . A decentralized government can better address regional disparities in cultural heritage, environment, preferences and needs, endowment of natural resources, and economic and social institutions (De Mello, 2004; Tiebout 1956; Huther and Shah 1996; Oates 1999) . A citizenry experiencing better government performance tends to believe that the government is willing and able to work for his/her interest, an essential element of political trust.
Second, decentralization helps control corruption, which is one of the main causes of trust (Dincer 2010; Shah 2006) . In addition, decentralization is often accompanied with increased competition between local governments for investment and other resources. This competition reduces the ability of bureaucrats to extract rents in exchange for services and discourages government from establishing interventionist and distortionary policies (Jin et al. 1999; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Qian and Weingast 1997) .
It should be noted that, however, decentralization can also lead to negative consequences, and the general relationship between decentralization and its political consequences still remains 7 unsettled in empirical studies (De Mello and Barenstein 2002, Fismand and Gatti 2002b; Treisman 2007a Treisman , 2007b . It is suggested that decentralization, by transferring considerable powers and resources to local government, introduces additional principal-agent problems. One Unfortunately, most efforts of empirical studies have been devoted to investigating the effect of decentralization on corruption or other aggregate effects at country level (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Fisman and Gatti 2002b; Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009) . While aggregate effects of decentralization are important, it is also, if not more, imperative to examine how individuals respond to the institutional reforms of decentralization. Hiskey and Seligson (2003) and Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2013) are two studies that turn attention to the direct effect of decentralization on individual attitudes. But both studies focus on one country, Bolivia and Columbia respectively, and concern only the variation within country. de Mello (2004) conducted the only cross-national study testing the effect of decentralization on attitudes of ordinary citizens towards government. However, he aggregated individuals' confidence in government for countries and tested the effect of fiscal decentralization on country-averaged government support. In short, there lack direct comparative tests of the relationship between 8 decentralization and individual attitudes across countries.
1 One way of advancing the debate would be to subject the competing arguments to a comprehensive and comparative test of the effect of decentralization, as an aggregated variable, on political trust for government institutions, measured at the individual level.
Decentralization as a moderating contextual variable
Driven by recent advancement of contextual analysis, we further posit that the relationship between decentralization and political trust does not only manifest in a direct manner. More importantly, decentralization provides an institutional context in which factors at the individual level take effect on political trust. That is, the effect of decentralization also works through shaping and moderating the relationship between political trust and its correlates at the individual level. Causal heterogeneity is a concern in much of the political science literature. Przeworski we believe that decentralization constitutes an environment for which individuals evaluate political system based on their individual attributes, including socio-economic ones or attitudinal ones. Therefore, its effect should manifest through shaping the relationship between political trust and its covariates and this relationship generates heterogeneous effect for people with different attributes.
We in this study particularly investigate the moderating effect of decentralization on the effect of democratic value on political trust. Among various individual factors of political trust, we stress the interactive effect of democratic value and decentralization for two major reasons.
First, the increase of democratic citizens is believed a major reason for trust decline worldwide.
In the literature of political trust, one of the major findings is that the rise of "critical citizens" Second, democratic value is stressed in this study because decentralization is in essence a democratic institutional reform that supposedly meets the rising democratic demands (Diamond 1999). On the face value, a decentralized system is a more democratic system and meets the moral need of democratic citizens for a political system. In a decentralized system, political power is rearranged to be more dispersed vertically. In such a way, decentralization introduces another dimension of checks and balance in political system. Decentralization also makes a polity more inclusive and renders a larger portion of government officials and institutions at local levels under the watch of the public. Such newly added democratic features serve to soften the negative feeling of democratic citizens towards government institutions that have long been perceived to fail democratic standards in norm.
In addition, we believe that the individuals with stronger democratic minds are more likely to respond positively to decentralization because the effects of decentralization listed in the previous section pertain mostly to those people. Second, decentralization, by enhancing the efficiency and quality of government performance, can also ease the criticism of democratic citizens. In modern politics, largely due to media's critical reporting, citizens are overwhelmed by the negative information of national government and politicians such as scandals, partisan bickering, and political incompetence (Kerbel 1995; Robinson and Sheehan 1983) , all of which makes democratic citizens disappointed with politicians and political institutions. Due to the limited access to national politics, people tend to rely more on the media reporting that is mostly negative when assessing government performance. This in turn causes them to withdraw support for government.
Decentralization helps provide alternative ways for the citizens to acquire information about government and governance and make their evaluation. By increasing the efficiency of policy making and service delivery, it signals that political system is not that incompetent. Moreover, by facilitating citizens to monitor and participate in policy-making processes to a greater extent, decentralization makes democratic and active citizens to understand that the political system is not as inaccessible as reported.
To sum, as a more democratic arrangement, decentralization's effect on political attitudes is more likely to be among democratically minded persons. But the positive moderating effect of decentralization is based on the presumption that decentralization does increase performance efficiency on the one hand and enhance democratic governance on the other hand. As pointed out in the previous section, decentralization does not always produce good results. Against potential objections to the positive effect of decentralization, we test the following three hypotheses:
H1: Citizens in countries with higher levels of decentralization show higher levels of political trust.
H2: Citizens with greater democratic values shows less trust for political institutions.

H3. The negative effect of democratic value on political trust is weaker in countries with
higher levels of decentralization.
Data, variables, and Measurements
Dependent variable: political trust
We draw the individual level data from the World Value Survey (WVS, the fifth wave) conducted during [2005] [2006] . We choose this dataset because among the available datasets, WVS covers the largest number of countries with variant social, economic, and political contexts. It hence enables us to conduct a comparative test of the effect of decentralization in different contexts.
To gauge political trust, we use the respondents' answers to the multi-item survey question:
"I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" The institutions include the armed forces, the police, the courts, the government, parliament, and civil service. Together they constitute the core political 13 institutions of a state. The answer ranges from 1 to 4 for each item and is recoded such that higher scores indicate higher levels of trust. We take the sum of the responses to the six items to create an index of political trust. Reliability test shows that the six items have a high level of internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha =0 .86.
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The value of this variable ranges from 6 to 24 on a scale with 37 value points.
Independent variable at country level
The primary independent variable of this study is decentralization. Decentralization is a multi-dimensioned concept. To avoid the bias caused by the choice of any single measurement, we follow some prominent studies on this topic (Fan et al. 2009; Schneider 2006) and measure decentralization at three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political in that order.
Fiscal decentralization is the most popular measurement of decentralization in the literature (Pryor 1968 , Oates 1972 . Panizza 1999 Matsubayashi, 2007; Fisman andGatti.2002; Dincer, 2010) .Fiscal measurement is preferred because it is an objective measurement and public datasets are easily accessible. And it serves as a good indicator because "the extent of a public authority's activities in taxation and in the expenditure of public funds is surely a component of fundamental importance in determining its influence on the allocation of resources" (Oates 1972,p.197 Administrative decentralization refers to how administrative resource including personnel is distributed across tiers of government. We measure it by using the much simplified indicator "personnel decentralization" drawn from a dataset compiled by Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009) .
This indicator measures the share of administrative staff employed at all subnational tiers of the government system. It is argued that the share of local government employees is a good proxy of administrative decentralization since supposedly a more administratively decentralized system should employ a larger share of staff at the subnational levels.
Federalism has been a traditional measure of political decentralization (Goldsmith, 1999; Treisman, 2000) . We measure political decentralization first by following this convention. In addition, we supplement it with a measurement of the degree of decision-making autonomy of local governments compiled by Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009) . This measurement gauges the extent to which subnational actors have the right to make political decisions. It includes two indices: "autonomy" and "residual authority."Autonomy refers to the situation that constitution reserves exclusive right to legislate on at least one specific policy area to subnational legislatures;
residual authority refers to a political system in which constitution gives subnational legislatures exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not specifically assigned in constitution.
At the aggregate level, we control a set of relevant factors in our full models 4 . The size of a country is believed to influence political support (Matsubayashi, 2007) . We therefore include both the population size and territory size of countries. We also control another important control factor-democracy, whose measure is provided in the dataset "Democracy and Dictatorship" (i.e., DD).DD is updated from the "Political and Economic Database" originally produced by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (ACLP). DD categorizes a polity as democracy if the executive is elected via the legislature or the legislature is directly elected, there is more than one party, and the executive power alternates. We also control the effect of two important economic factors, GDP per capita and growth rate of GDP per capita. Summary statistics of all variables used in this study is presented in Appendix 1.
Independent variable at individual level
The most important independent variable at the individual level is democratic value. Given the global acceptance of the idea of democracy, direct questions on democratic commitment are likely to induce socially desirable answers. With this in mind, we choose to measure one's democratic value based on the respondent's answer to three items of a four-item question in WVS that asks the respondents' agreement with democratic procedures ("Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections;" "Having experts making decisions according to what they think is best for the country;" and "Having the army rule."). While these items do not exhaust all the democratic procedures, together they can provide a conceptual anchorage and hence serve as a good test of one's democratic commitment. Since explanatory factor analysis shows that three items load to one factor indicating the consistence in the respondents' view towards democracy, we sum the responses as the measurement of one's democratic value.
Building upon previous studies of political trust and at the same time limited by data availability of WVS, we include the following controls at the individual level: gender (0 for female, 1 for male), age (in years), marriage experience (1 for yes), education (in years), social economic status (from lowest to highest), and interpersonal trust (1 for lowest trust, and 4 for high trust). A more detailed discussion of the effect of these variables on political trust is skipped for brevity.
Analyses and results
We proceed first to examine the effect of decentralization at the country level, in part as a replication of previous studies related to this topic. We then turn to our main analysis at the individual level to see whether it is in agreement of aggregate analysis. After that, we further investigate the indirect effect of decentralization through introducing an interaction term between decentralization and democratic value. Lastly, to further test the robustness of our findings we conduct analyses for democratic and authoritarian countries separately. For each set of analyses, we measure decentralization in three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political (federalism and subnational autonomy).
Aggregate analysis
We first run regression analyses (OLS) to detect whether there is a relationship between decentralization and political trust at the country level. To that end, we obtain the aggregate-level political trust for each country by taking the country average of institutional trust. Model 1, 2, and 3 Table 1 are analyses of the effect of fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, and federalism, respectively. Model 4 is the analysis of the alternative measurement of political decentralization, local autonomy.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The analyses in Table 1 
Individual-level analysis
Turning our attention to the respondents' expressed institutional trust at the individual level, we employ a random-intercept multi-level model to estimate the effect of decentralization on political trust. This is because the causal relationship between the two varies across both countries and individuals. Although the number of aggregate units is reasonable large (47 countries in total), we estimate the multilevel models separately for each of the four country-level measures of decentralization. In order to test the robustness of our analyses, we first conduct a set of analyses that only include measures of decentralization as the independent variable at the country level (Model 5-8), and then include a full set of variables at the country level(Model 9-12). As shown in Table 2 , both analyses yield similar results.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Table 2 are consistently different from findings emerged from country-level analyses,
Results in
showing that regardless of its specific measures, decentralization is not significantly associated with political trust at the individual level at all. This indicates that decentralization does not exert a direct impact on how people perceive various political institutions and authorities. In other words, citizens do not evaluate their government more (or less) preferably simply because its power and authority are more devolved to subnational levels. To rule out that the insignificant association is artificially caused by our operationalization of political trust (the average of six items: government, police, armed forces, parliament, police, and civil services), we conduct the same set of analyses for each of the six political institutions and the results are consistent. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Cross-level interaction
Then, what causes the significant association between decentralization and political trust at the aggregate level while there is no direct effect of decentralization at the individual level?
Although exerting no direct impact, decentralization, as we argued, can shape the public's perception of political institutions via affecting the relationship between political trust and its correlates, in particular, democratic value. We therefore include a cross-level interaction term between democratic value and decentralization as measured in different ways. The analytical 20 results of these models are reported in Table 3 (Model 13-16) 6 . As expected, while democratic value is negatively associated with political trust, its interactions with both fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization are positive and significant (Model 13 and 14) . That is, with a higher level of fiscal or administrative decentralization in a given country, the negative effect of democratic value on political trust decreases significantly. This indicates that vertical dispersion of fiscal and administrative power mitigates the negative association between democratic value and political trust.
In order to present more meaningful interpretation of the moderating effects discussed above, we plot the marginal effects of fiscal and administrative decentralization based on Model 13 and Model 14 (Figure 1-a & 1-b) .Both plots show that the effect of democratic value is negative and significant at lower values of decentralization. The negative effects of democratic value, however, decrease in magnitude with higher levels of decentralization, and it becomes insignificant when decentralization reaches its higher end. In short, decentralization helps attenuating the potential detrimental effect of democratic value on political trust.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In contrast, the two measurements of political decentralization, federalism (Model 15) and local autonomy (Model 16), do not have a positive interactive effect with democratic value.
While the interaction between federalism and democratic value is not significant (Model 15), the interaction between autonomy and democratic value is significant and negative (Model 16). This finding indicates that with higher degrees of autonomy of subnational units, people with greater democratic value are more critical of political institutions. Marginal effect plot in Figure 1-c shows that the effect of democratic value stays negative at all levels of local autonomy, and the negative effect increases in magnitude with a higher level of autonomy. Therefore, it shows that compared to other dimensions of decentralization, political decentralization entails a dynamic that aggravates the negative feelings of democratically minded citizens about the political system, an important issue to be addressed in the next section.
Split-sample analysis
Presumably, decentralization can lead to varying political consequences under different regime settings. The above analytical results show that democracy is consistently negatively associated political trust, in both aggregate and individual-level analyses. We therefore split the global sample based on whether a country is democratic or not and conduct the same set of analyses for two types of countries separately (Table 4) [Insert Table 4 about here]
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Analyses using a full set of aggregate variables yield similar findings.
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The results indicate that the political impacts of decentralization are stronger in democratic countries than in authoritarian countries. In democratic countries, the pattern of the moderating effect of decentralization is consistent with that of the main analyses in Table 3 . Both fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization mitigates the negative effect of democratic value on trust; but local autonomy, an indicator of political decentralization, amplifies that negative effect. The interactive effect of decentralization and democratic value is less evident in autocratic countries. In those countries, only administrative administration works to boost political trust of institutions through decreasing the negative effect of democratic value. Fiscal decentralization does not make the democratically-minded person to believe in authoritarian institutions at all; and political decentralization has no significant indirect effect either. These findings imply that decentralization as an institutional reform does not influence people' view of political institutions in authoritarian regimes as much as it does in democratic countries.
Nevertheless, given the small number of authoritarian countries in WVS sample, we are cautious not to infer much about the insignificance of the effect of decentralization on political trust.
8
Conclusion
With ever increasing burden of modern governments in managing domestic affairs, national government around the world are either forced or motivated to reallocate authority downwards to 8
To deal with the limited number of cases at the country level, we conducted multilevel analyses using Bayesian approach as suggested by Stegmuler (2013) and obtained similar findings.
Results are available upon request.
subnational and local units of government. As a result, citizens are exposed to more daily operation of government and involved in more political or policy-making process. Does such a vertical dispersion of political power and authority reshape the relationship between government and its citizenry? Does it change how ordinary people perceive various political institutions and actors? In particular, does this institutional reform help restore the public confidence in political institutions that have been declining in recent decades? To answer these questions, this study provides a much-needed comparative analysis of the effect of decentralization on political trust.
Our analysis first disproves the direct effect of decentralization on individual attitudes in spite of their significant association at the country level. We then show that the trust-fostering function of decentralization at two dimensions (fiscal and administrative) works through mitigating the negative effect of democratic value on political trust. However, one measure of political decentralization-subnational political autonomy-aggravates the negative effect of democratic value.
The different or even opposite effect of decentralization measured in different dimensions political trust warrants further discussions. The finding that political decentralization aggravates the negative effect of democratic value suggests that power devolution in political sense is not necessarily beneficial for the government in terms of gaining public confidence. This is probably due to the unique nature of political decentralization compared to the two other dimensions of decentralization. In democracies, if political decentralization operates inappropriately, the decentralized political making process makes stalemate, partisan politics, and other problems of democratic political process more salient and thus critical citizen are more disappointed by 24 democratic system. In autocracies, the decentralization of political process can make a democratically-minded person more aware of the undemocratic nature of the political system that has been concealed by propaganda. In either case, democratically-minded persons get more dissatisfied with the political system and hence more likely distrust its political institutions when they are more exposed to political process in a decentralized system. Although political decentralization has a negative effect, decentralization policies overall help rebuild political trust among the public. This is so because it is the administrative and fiscal domains that most governments focus on when implementing decentralization. How political powers are arranged vertically has usually been set by a country's constitution and is difficult to 25 be changed. Compared to political decentralization how administrative authorities are distributed or how revenue or expenditure is assigned among different tiers of government is much less formidable to change and is often the focus of the of government reforms. Although such policy reforms cannot directly increase the affection of all people for the government, it does help meet the rising democratic demand of the public. 
